31. Preemption.
 
    a. "Each type of regulation [zoning and gaming licensing] is the subject of separate and distinct legislative authority."
Primm v. City of Reno, 70 Nev. 7, 15, 252 P.2d 835 (1953). No. 3.
 
    b. "We need not here decide as to the legality of land use zoning as a method of control in the distribution or limitation of businesses which, by virtue of their character, are made subject to regulatory control of that nature. It should in any event at least be clear that the regulation of land use by zoning does not preclude and is not inconsistent with independent regulatory limitation or distribution of businesses pursuant to independent statutory authority."  Id. at 17.
 
    c. "Whenever a legislature sees fit to adopt a general scheme for the regulation of a particular subject, local control over the same subject, through legislation, ceases. In determining whether the legislature intended to occupy a particular field to the exclusion of all local regulation, the Court may look to the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme. Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 57 Nev. 332, 65 P.2d 133 (1937)."
Lamb v. Mirin, 90 Nev. 329, 332, 526 P.2d 80 (1974). [not a zoning case] No. 17.

    d. "That which is allowed by the general laws of a state cannot be prohibited by local ordinance, without an express grant on the part of the legislature."  Id. at 333.
 
    e. "In Lamb v. Mirin, 90 Nev. 329, 526 P.2d 80 (1974), we noted that in determining whether the // legislature intended to occupy a particular field to the exclusion of all local regulation the courts should look to the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme. 'That which is allowed by the general laws of a state cannot be prohibited by local ordinance, without an express grant on the part of the legislature.' Lamb, 90 Nev. at 333, 526 P.2d at 82.
Flick Theater v. City of Las Vegas, 104 Nev. 87, 89-90, 752 P.2d 235 (1988). No. 26.
 
    f. "The state has delegated to the city express authority to regulate the location of sexually oriented businesses. General authority to regulate the location and use of buildings and structures, in order to promote the health and general welfare of the community, is granted under NRS 278.020 and NRS 278.250. These state statutes do not constitute a comprehensive statutory scheme which purports to regulate the location of sexually oriented businesses throughout the state and do not indicate any attempt by the state to occupy the field. To the contrary, the intent of the state, as clearly manifested in the above statutes, is to vest in local government the authority to regulate such matters as they see fit. These ordinances are not, as claimed by Flick, an excessive exercise of municipal legislative power that renders the ordinances void under state law." Id. at 90.

    g. "There is no state law indicating that the ruling of the State Engineer preempts a county or other governmental entity from enacting zoning laws that impose limitations on water use that are more restrictive than those of the State Engineer. .... County and local governments can place more burdensome restrictions on local growth and development as long as those restrictions are consistent with the relevant long-term comprehensive plans, Nevada law, and notions of public welfare."
Serpa v. County of Washoe, 111 Nev. 1081, 1085, 901 P.2d 690 (1995). No. 47.