54. Vacation/Abandonment of Streets.
 
    a. "While the question of the necessity for closing a street or highway may belong exclusively to the legislative department of the government, still the question of public purpose or use remains subject to court review. As a rule, in such cases, the court will permit the defendants to make the issue and present evidence in support of it, unless it is manifest from the pleadings and proceedings that such closing is for the public interest. There are sufficient allegations in the complaint, if established by proof, to raise serious doubt as to whether // the vacation was for the public interest. This would not appear to be a case where it is manifest that a vacation is for the public interest."
Teacher Bldg. Co. v. Las Vegas, 68 Nev. 307, 323-324, 232 P.2d 119 (1951). No. 4.
 
    b. "The standard to be used by a governing body in determining the propriety of the vacation of a street is whether the public would be materially injured by such vacation. NRS 278.480(4)."
Lied v. County of Clark, 94 Nev. 275, 279, 579 P.2d 171 (1978). No. 22.
 
    c. "We have previously held that '[t]he standard to be used by a governing body in determining the propriety of the vacation of a street is whether the public would be materially injured by such vacation. NRS 278.480(4).' Lied v. County of Clark, 94 Nev. 275, 279, 579 P.2d 171 (1978)."
L & T Corp. v. City of Henderson, 98 Nev. 501, 503, 654 P.2d 1015 (1982). No. 28.
 
    d. "A street vacation to private interest is not sufficient, per se, to invalidate the governmental action. The public welfare may be served by placing street lands in the hands of private individuals. (citations omitted). The record reflects a basis for concluding that in spite of Eldorado's ownership of the vacated portion of the street, the public will also be benefited. The parking garage should alleviate Henderson's parking problems while the hotel has the potential of stimulating the city's economy." Id. at 503.
 
    e. "Lied stands for the general proposition that a property owner whose property does not abut upon the portion of the street to be vacated, does not have standing to challenge a procedurally correct vacation. However, an exception to the general rule is that any person, whether or not a landowner, has standing to challenge and obtain injunctive relief against a proposed vacation when he or she has suffered special or peculiar damage differing in kind from the general public. See, Teacher Bldg. Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 68 Nev. 307, 232 P.2d 119 (1951), and Blanding v. City of Las Vegas, 52 Nev. 52, 280 P. 644 (1929). Here, appellants have not shown such special or peculiar injury. The claim of special injury due to interference with property access and a diminution in property value through loss of business is not supported by case law. The vacation of a street requiring travel by a more circuitous route is not a special injury as long as the landowner still retains an alternate mode of egress from or ingress to his or her land, even if less convenient. Blanding v. City of Las Vegas, id." Id. at 504.
 
    f. "NRS 278.480(4) provides that a governing body may abandon property if it 'is satisfied that the public will not be materially injured' by the proposed abandonment. We have previously rejected the argument that there is a 'public purpose' component to the abandonment statute. L & T Corp. v. City of Henderson, 98 Nev. 501, 503, 654 P.2d 1015, 1016 (1982). We therefore conclude that the district court erred when it focused on the benefits of abandonment, rather than any 'material injury' the abandonment may cause. The lower court did mention, without discussion, that it found a 'public detriment' associated with the abandonment. However, the court's unsupported conclusory remark does not constitute a well-reasoned finding of 'material injury to the public...'" City of Reno v. Estate of Wells, 110 Nev. 1218, 1221, 885 P.2d 545 (1994). No. 41.
 
    g. "In Tighe v. Von Goerken, 108 Nev. 440, 833 P.2d 1135 (1992), we noted that "'the essence of the abuse of discretion, of the arbitrariness or capriciousness of government action...is most often found in an apparent absence of any grounds or reasons for the decision,'" or in other words, "'[w]e did it just because we did it.'" Id. at 442-43, 833 P.2d at 1136 (quoting City Council v. Irvine, 102 Nev. 277, 280, 721 P.2d 371, 372-73 (1996)). Additionally, we have previously accepted the definitions of arbitrary and capricious, respectively, as 'baseless' or 'despotic' and "'a sudden turn of mind without apparent motive; a freak, whim, mere fancy.'" City Council v. Irvine, 102 Nev. 277, 278-79, 721 P.2d 371, 372 (1986) (quoting The Oxford Universal Dictionary).
Id. at 1222.
 
    h. "'Substantial evidence' is that which 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' See, e.g., Ruggles v. Public Service Comm'n, 109 Nev. 36, 40, 846 P.2d 299, 302 (1993). Substantial evidence need not be voluminous; and in this case, it may be inferentially shown by the lack of evidence that abandonment of the right-of-way would impose a material injury upon the public." Id. at 1222.
 
    i. "In sum, reasonable minds may properly conclude that the abandonment does not result in a material public injury and therefore, the // Council's decision is supported by substantial evidence."
Id. at 1222-1223.